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On April 25, 2001, ABC television ran an interview with Bush about his first 100 days. The interviewer, Charles Gibson, asked Bush whether the U.S. had an obligation to defend Taiwan.
"Yes, we do. And the Chinese must understand that,"Bush replied.
"And you would..."
"Yes, I would."
"With the full force of the American military?"
"Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself."
It was one of the strongest statements the U.S. had made about the delicate issue of Taiwan. The Chinese were very upset.
Condoleezza Rice called Brent Scowcroft, who had had her job under Bush's father, and asked him to come see the president. Scowcroft met privately with Bush and Rice.
How do we get out of this? Bush essentially asked.
After listening to Scowcroft, Bush asked him to go on a secret mission to China to meet with President Jiang Zemin and explain U.S. policy. Scowcroft, who was going to China on private business, agreed to talk with Jiang on the president's behalf. He told the Chinese leader that Bush's policy was to defend Taiwan if the island was attacked unprovoked, but if the Taiwanese took action to change the status quo on their own, the united States would not defend them. Jiang and Bush seemed satisfied, and Scowcroft's secret mission never became public.

- Bob Woodward, State of Denial

Q Mr. President, George Gedda of AP. Given the sensitivity of the issue, do you believe the referendum planned by the Taiwanese on March 20th should be cancelled?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Someone needs to interpret that.

Let me tell you what I've just told the Premier on this issue. The United States government's policy is one China, based upon the three communiqus [sic] and the Taiwan Relations Act. We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions* made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.

- The White House, 2003

So, Chen Shui Bian, provocateur extraordinaire, has fulfilled his term as the democratically elected "Taiwan leader," and a part of me is happy to see the change. I haven't hidden my opinions on Chen and the DPP's shortcomings of recent, and I'm quite optimistic about the Ma administration may hold.

That said, part of the reason I'm happy to see a change isn't exactly because I believe that Chen was all the less than savory things he was accused of being (corrupt, provocative, divisive, etc.), but that he seemed to play into that trap. I often got the impression that Chen's reflexive reaction to criticism showed a lack of maturity. He seemed to sink to the level of his opponents, rather than rising above them. I'm thinking of instances when, for example, he told people that if they love China so much, nobody's going to stop them from swimming there.

However, something very important was brought up in a great article by Jonathan Adams at Thirsty Ghosts about this "Flawed Patriot." The point that struck me is Adams' assertion that Chen's openness to critical opposition will be a considerable part of his legacy:

History will likely be more kind to Chen. Though deeply flawed, he presided over a critical period of maturation for Taiwan's young democracy. This was the fruit of a long process begun by the DPP and other activists more than twenty years ago.

Under his watch, Taiwan scrapped the National Assembly -- one of the last major institutions of the authoritarian past. Taiwanese people gained the right of referendum in 2003, and the right to approve constitutional revisions in 2005.

Chen's contribution to democracy included strong support for freedom of expression and an independent judiciary. His government accepted the scrutiny of the press and courts to an unprecedented degree in Taiwan's history.

The island's media -- recently ranked Asia's freest by the US non-governmental organization Freedom House [ORIT: I've noted before what I see as the downside of this freedom] –- broadcast relentless criticisms of Chen, much of it deserved. For example, some TV stations ran 'round-the-clock, clearly partisan coverage of anti-Chen protests in the fall of 2006, without interference from Chen's government.

Taiwan's judiciary remains a work in progress, but Chen's government by and large submitted itself to the rule of law. Ironically, this was part of his downfall: independent prosecutors traced corruption back to his own top aides and relatives; Chen himself may be charged after leaving office.

I wasn't here before Chen, so I never would have noticed the difference. Yet, the fact that Chen conducted himself in that way, no matter his other flaws, should say a lot for Taiwan he has left in his wake, and it will hopefully make Ma's job a lot harder, because a president, especially a KMT president, needs the "encouragement" of a skeptical public. We saw in the US what an unquestioning populace, myself included, can be led into.

As a side note, there's another legacy Chen leaves behind that happens to be the very thing that most people believe lost Hsieh the election: China-Taiwan economic relations. It's this part of Chen's presidency that the KMT did a magnificent job of downplaying. The fact that Chen actually did a lot to advance China and Taiwan's economic ties has been written about at great length, but what's interesting is a comment by Max Hirsch (also a contributor to Thirsty Ghosts) that I came across recently on the East-West Center's blog:

Although typically branded a ”troublemaker” — ie, one who has antagonized Beijing and Washington — Chen also leaves behind the much quieter legacy of pushing the KMT to transform (as you mention) and allowing for a degree of cross-strait economic integration that has been unprecedented, even under KMT administrations preceding his.

While declining to dismantle (indeed, he even threw up some of his own) some of the roadblocks that have hindered cross-strait trade, Chen has presided over a massive (the largest in history) trade and investment flow across the strait, while hammering out many of the prickly details of further links for which credit will ultimately go to the KMT.

A few days ago, I sat down with a top KMT official slated for a Cabinet position under Ma. Off-the-record, the official admitted that the foundations for opening up Taiwan to Chinese tourists, and for direct air and shipping links had already been laid through years of painstaking negotiations with Beijing, initiated and conducted by the DPP-led government. I doubt that much credit will go to the DPP for this, however. Equally sad is the lost legacy of how the DPP played a role in forcing the KMT to democratize from without; indeed, the opposition party (soon to become the ruling one) was, by and large, dragged kicking and screaming into democracy; now it is also beginning to embrace the localization movement that defines the DPP: Oddly enough, ”Taiwan First” was a slogan that the KMT clung to during Ma’s presidential campaign.

Yes, cross-strait ties appear to be in an upswing as Ma chooses rhetoric and stances that are more palatable to Beijing. However, it bears reminding that behind the prospect of that relaxation of cross-strait relations and resumption of more official talks is the critical and intricate groundwork laid by the DPP. In the case of tourism, for example, virtually all that’s left is for Ma and Hu to sign on the dotted line. When Ma does sign, he will do so from the position of a party and government that is increasingly Taiwan-centric and democratic for reasons that have much to do with the DPP.

A troubled 8-year presidency? Indeed. And certainly, sometimes needlessly rocky relations with the US and China contributed to Chen’s troubled tenure. However, to boil down his legacies and those of the DPP to antagonization is an unsophisticated perspective in summing up this changing-of-the-guard milestone in Taiwan’s history.

It's off-the-record, so take it with a grain of salt. But, in the end, Chen's election and the US' opportunity to support Taiwan's burgeoning democracy became an inconvenience, as I noted in part one. It was just plain bad timing on Taiwan's part. I've never seen this mentioned in an article about Taiwan or about Chen. The US' swift change in policy is usually attributed to Chen's provocative statements, nary a mention of 9-11.

What's done is done. On to Ma...

Just before Ma's inauguration, when I had intended to write about this, I was going to mention that this change in the executive, which one could argue the US almost campaigned for, was a great opportunity for the United States to make a significant shift in it's policy towards the island. It had gotten the candidate it wanted, "the moderate," and should seize the moment. What I had envisioned was a symbolic step -- such as letting Ma visit the US or opening up new, direct, high-level communications -- that would show to China that the US was not going to let China define the boundaries of the discussion. If China had a problem, the US could offer three-party meetings, taking on the role of facilitator.

Just, something, I thought.

The unlikely reality of such a meeting, though, was soon met with the reality that nothing, at least for now, was going to change. This became evident when Ma's request to visit the United States was refused:

Washington has denied a request by president-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to visit the US before his inauguration on May 20, American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Stephen Young said yesterday.

Shortly after his victory in the March 22 presidential election, Ma said he intended to visit the US before he takes office “to improve bilateral ties.”

A visit “wasn’t needed,” Young said at his semi-annual press conference. “Frankly, it [the visit] was not necessary because we are engaged [at] a number of levels.”

This reminds me of another thing the White House official mentioned to us at the breakfast meeting I mentioned in part one.

"Why is it so important to have official meetings with Taiwanese officials when we're already having high-level, unofficial meetings with them," goes an argument. "It's just a change in symbolism if you make them official. Why is it worth the hassle?"

That symbolism, though, is exactly the point. It's all symbolic. Of course Ma's visit "wasn't needed." This is the 21st century, after all. Ma could have saved himself the trouble and skyped Bush. That way they could have gotten all of their bases covered without the jet-lag and the spewing of fossil fuels into the stratosphere.

No such luck. It doesn't appear that much is changing in the Taiwan-China-US relationship. Sure, Taiwan has sent it's first high level representative in decades to have officials talks with the Chinese and the Straits are probably as peaceful as they've been in decades, which is great. Really, it's great. I can't say that enough. But, it's all done on China's terms, and turf, which doesn't seem to bother the current administration in the US. After all, it let's them focus on finding out how to make Iraq look pretty so McCain can win in November.

* The "actions" there, I'm assuming, was the decision to hold a democratic referendum.